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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1993 several former waitresses at the restaurant "Hooters"
sued the chain for sexual harassment. The lawsuits alleged that
Hooters established a work environment in which its customers felt
free to make sexual comments and advances to its waitresses.'
Examples of the offensive nature of the work environment included
the name of the restaurant ("Hooters," a slang term for women's
breasts) and the sexually provocative uniforms the waitresses were
required to wear. Responses to the lawsuits varied widely. Some
individuals took the view that Hooters should be found liable for the
sexual harassment of its waitresses by its customers, 2 while others
argued that the Hooters waitresses should not be allowed to recover
for conduct they should have anticipated at the time they chose to
3
work at Hooters.
The Hooters lawsuits raised the question that is the focus of
this Note: should there be an assumption of risk defense to some
hostile work environment sexual harassment claims?4 Although the
Felepe v. Bloomington Hooters, Inc., No. 93-11134, Complaint at 11 (D. Minn. 1993)
1.
("Complaint").
2.
For example, Patricia Ireland, the President of the National Organization for Women
stated, "I think that the very name and logo [of Hooters] is the kind of approach that invites
sexual harassment. It basically says these, quote, girls are available at least to be ogled...."
Patty Shillington, Hooters Concept: Sexist or Just Good, Clean Fun?, Miami Herald 1J (Aug. 1,
1993).
For example, Laura M. Maciejko, a citizen of Cedar Brook, New Jersey, wrote, "It is
3.
with outrage that I read July 22 about 'Hooters' restaurants being sued for sexual harassment
by their waitresses. Didn't these women research 'Hooters' before applying for the job? ...
Didn't they see the outfits they were required to wear? I can't believe any woman would accept
a position in such an establishment and not expect to be leered at and be the subject of come-os
... What's next? Playboy centerfolds suing Hugh Hefner because men are making suggestive
remarks?" Letters to the Editor,Philadelphia Inquirer E04 (Aug. 1, 1993).
The statement of the President of NOW, see note 2, and that of the New Jersey
4.
citizen, see note 3, represent two sides of the sexual harassment issue. The former position
takes the view that all women can be victims of sexual harassment and that women do not
sacrifice their right to have a workplace free of sexual harassment by choosing to work at places
like Hooters. In order for women to become truly equal in society and in the workplace, Hooters
should not be allowed to escape liability for the harassment it encourages its customers to inflict
upon its waitresses. In short, Hooters waitresses should not be found to have assumed the risk
of sexual harassment. The latter position, on the other hand, takes the view that anti-discrimi-
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lawsuits were settled, the issue remains relevant as the potential for
hostile work environment sexual harassment claims by employees of
Hooters and other sexually charged environments continues to exist.5
Part II of this Note provides the legal background for the issue.
It provides a brief history of hostile work environment sexual
involving harassment by
focusing on cases
harassment,
nonemployees. It also describes the defense of assumption of risk,
and distinguishes assumption of risk from the unwelcomeness
element in current sexual harassment law. Part III examines the
usefulness of an assumption of risk defense in cases involving
sexually charged workplaces, describing in detail the allegations of
the Hooters lawsuits and applying assumption of risk concepts to the
sexual harassment claims in the lawsuits. Part IV attempts to
determine when an assumption of risk defense to sexual harassment
should be permitted by comparing the Hooters claims to the highly
disfavored Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company.6 Part V discusses
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed defense, as well as
alternatives to the proposed defense, and concludes that assumption
of risk concepts are useful in sexual harassment law and should be
utilized, even if not by explicitly allowing on assumption of risk
defense.

nation laws can go too far in "protecting" women. Women will never be equal in society or in the
workplace until they are seen as able to take responsibility for their choices, rather than as perpetual victims. Therefore, women who choose to work at places like Hooters, knowing of the nature of the work environment, should be barred from recovery because they assumed the risk of
sexual harassment. For futher discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of allowing an

assumption of risk defense to sexual harassment, see Part V.
5.
There currently is no explicit assumption of risk defense in sexual harassment law.
However, the assumption of risk defense has some similarities to the unwelcomeness element of

current sexual harassment law. See Part II.C for a comparison of assumption of risk and
unwelcomeness.
6.
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Sexual Harassment
1. Hostile Work Environment in General
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer
from discriminating "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ."7 It
was not until the late 1970s, however, that courts began to recognize
sexual harassment as a type of sex discrimination prohibited by Title
VII.8 The first type of sexual harassment claim courts recognized
involved the conditioning of job benefits on sexual favors, now known
as "quid pro quo" harassment.9 In the early 1980s, courts began to
recognize a second type of sexual harassment claim, hostile work
environment sexual harassment, which arises when unwelcome conduct based on sex creates a hostile environment. Such harassment
can occur even in the absence of tangible job detriments. 10
In MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court recognized hostile work environment harassment, holding that a plaintiff
may establish a violation of Title VII by showing that discrimination
The
on the basis of sex created an abusive work environment."

7.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
Barbara Lindemann and David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassmentin Employment Law 13
8.
(BNA, 1992).
See, for example, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part,
9.
vacated in part, on separate grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). (holding that an employer
violates Title VII when a supervisor dismisses an employee because she refused to have sex
with him); Tomkins v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977)
(holding that an employer violates Title VII when a supervisor conditions an employee's job
status on favorable response to his sexual advances); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (holding that a superior violates Title VII when an employee's job is abolished after
she rejects his sexual advances). In their treatise, Barbara Lindemann and David Kadue
describe the essence of a quid pro quo claim as "that the individual has been forced to choose
between suffering an economic detriment and submitting to sexual demands," a" 'put out or get
out' bargain". Lindemann and Kadue, Sexual Harassmentin Employment Law at 8.
10. See, for example, Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding
that "under certain circumstances the creation of an offensive or hostile work environment due
to sexual harassment can violate Title VII irrespective of whether the complainant suffers
tangible detriment"); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that sexually harassing conduct can violate Title VII even without causing a tangible detriment).
11. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). The Court endorsed the EEOC Guidelines that defined sexual
harassment, and added the requirement that, in order to be actionable, the harassment must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an

1995]

ASSUMPTION OFRISK

1111

Meritor Court did not clearly specify the elements of a cause of action
for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The lower courts,
however, have generally held that the necessary elements are: (1) the
employee belongs to a protected group; 12 (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature; 13 (3) the harassment complained of was based upon
sex; 14 (4) the harassment complained of was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment and
create an abusive working environment; 5 and (5) the existence of
employer responsibility.16 Courts have differed, however, in their
determinations of the proper standard to determine if harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working
17
environment.
In Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc.,' the Supreme Court clarified the requirements for establishing a hostile work environment
sexual harassment claim. The Court held that to be actionable, conduct need not seriously affect the plaintiffs emotional well-being or
cause the plaintiff to suffer injury. 19 The Court also held that a dual
abusive working environment. Id. at 67. The Court also stated that the gravamen of a sexual
harassment claim is that the sex-related conduct was unwelcome, such that the court must
inquire as to whether the plaintiff by her conduct indicated that the sexual conduct was unwelcome, not whether her participation in the conduct was voluntary. Id. at 68.
12. See, for example, Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. All this element requires in any sex discrimination case is a "simple stipulation that the employee is a man or a woman." Id.
13. Id. The employee must show that the conduct was unwelcome "in the sense that the
employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as
undesirable or offensive." Id. In Meritor,the Court held that a complainant's sexually provocative speech and dress is relevant in determining whether he or she found particular sexual
advances unwelcome. 477 U.S. at 69.
14. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. The plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she
would not have been subjected to the harassing conduct. Id. The court noted that in the typical
case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a female worker, "it is obvious that
the supervisor did not treat male employees in a similar fashion." Id.
15. Id. at 904.
16. Id. at 905. The plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to take prompt corrective action. Id.
17. See, for example, Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures,Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir.
1990) (stating that a court should consider the" 'likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a
reasonable person's ability to perform his or her work' " (quoting Brooms v. Regal Tube
Company, 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1989)); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that "a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment").
18. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
19. Id. at 371. The Court stated that "Title VII comes into play before the harassing
conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." Id. at 370. The Court resolved a conflict among the
federal circuits as to whether the conduct needed to pass that threshold to be actionable. Id.
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objective-subjective standard should be applied in determining
whether conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile
work environment.20 The conduct must be such that a reasonable
person would find it hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive. 21 The Court noted
further that whether an environment is hostile or abusive should be
determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances, including
the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct; whether the
conduct was physically threatening or humiliating; and whether the
conduct unreasonably interfered with the employee's work perform22
ance.
2. Harassment by Non-Employees
A substantial element of the Hooters lawsuits involved allegations of sexual harassment of Hooters waitresses by customers of
Hooters.23 While there have been many cases involving sexual harassment and many articles covering the topic, 24 relatively little has
been litigated and written about the harassment of employees by
nonemployees. 25 The first cases featuring this issue involved employer-imposed sexually provocative dress requirements that resulted
in sexual harassment by nonemployees.
a. Dress Code Cases
In EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp.,26 the Equal Employment

Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") and Margaret Hasselman, a
former lobby attendant in an office building, sued the company that
managed the office building for sex discrimination because it required

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 371.
23. See Complaint at 11-13 (cited in note 1).
24. See, for example, Robert J. Aalberts and Lorne H. Seldman, Sexual Harassment of
Employees by Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 Pepperdine L. Rev.
447, 447 n.1 (1994) (describing the voluminous amount of scholarly research in the past five
years on sexual harassment).
25. See generally Aalberts and Seldman, 21 Pepperdine L. Rev. 447 (discussing employer
liability for sexual harassment of employees by non-employees); Joseph G. Allegretti, Sexual
Harassmentby Nonemployees: The Limits of Employer Liability, 9 Employee Rel. L. J. 98 (1983)
(discussing sexual harassment by non-employees); Rhonda Werner, Note, Exposing Employers
in the Hostile Work Environment: Appearance Standards that Lead to Sexual Harassment, 15
Hamline J. Pub. L. & Policy 145 (1994) (discussing employer liability for appearance standards
that result in the sexual harassment of employees by non-employees).
26. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
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its female lobby attendants to wear sexually provocative uniforms.
The uniform at issue, known as the Bicentennial, resembled an
American flag and was to be worn as a poncho.27 Hasselman found the
uniform to be short and revealing on both sides; it exposed her thighs
and portions of her buttocks. 28 When Hasselman wore the uniform in
the office building lobby, she was subjected to repeated harassment in
the form of sexual propositions, lewd comments, and gestures. 29 The
court held that Sage's requirement that Hasselman wear the
Bicentennial uniform, when it knew that wearing the uniform
subjected her to sexual harassment, constituted sex discrimination in
30
violation of Title VII.
Although Sag6 Realty was decided before the theory of hostile
work environment sexual harassment was recognized by the courts,
the facts were such that Hasselman was likely subject to hostile work
environment sexual harassment. 31 Because of her sex, Hasselman
was required to wear a sexually provocative uniform that subjected
her to unwelcome sexual propositions and comments, and this harassment was severe and pervasive enough to alter her working conditions and create an abusive working environment. 3 2 After Sage
Realty, several other courts stated that requiring female employees to
wear sexually provocative attire as a condition of employment could

violate Title VII.

33

27. Id. at 604.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 605. Observers made comments such as "I'll run it up the flagpole any time you
want...." Id. at 605 n.11.
30. Id. at 609. The court found that the sex discrimination in Sage Realty was of the same
nature as that found in Tomkins, 568 F.2d 1044, and Barnes, 561 F.2d 983. Id. Barnes and
Tomkins were two of the first quid pro quo sexual harassment cases. The Sage Realty court
stated, "Although in Tomkins andBarnes the victims of sex discrimination were subjected to the
direct sexual advances of their supervisors, the reasoning of those courts is entirely apposite
here, where [the defendants] knowingly allowed Hasselman, a female employee, to remain, as a
condition of her employment, in a position where she would be subjected to sexual harassment
on the job." Id.
31. See text accompanying notes 12-16 (listing the elements of a hostile work environment
sexual harassment claim). See also Aalberts and Seidman, 21 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 455 (cited
in note 24) (stating that Sage Realty could possibly have been decided on the hostile environment theory).
32. The court stated that wearing the uniform interfered with Hassehnan's ability to
perform her duties properly. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 611.
33. In Marentette v. Michigan Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980), the
court stated in dicta that an employer-imposed sexually provocative dress code which subjects
employees to sexual harassment "could well violate the true spirit and the literal language of
Title VII." In EEOC v. Newtown Inn Associates, 647 F. Supp. 957, 958 (E.D. Va. 1986), the
EEOC charged Newtown Inn Associates with subjecting its cocktail waitresses to sexual harassment by requiring them to project an air of sexual availability on the job by wearing pro-
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The sexually provocative dress cases often involve claims by an
employer that it has the right to impose grooming and dress requirements or that the wearing of a provocative uniform is a bona fide
occupational qualification ('BFOQ").34 The Sage Realty court responded to the former argument by stating that while an employer
has the prerogative to impose reasonable grooming and dress requirements on its employees when those requirements present no
distinct employment disadvantages and have a negligible effect on
employment opportunities, an employer does not have the unfettered
discretion to require its employees to wear any uniform the employer
chooses, including sexually provocative uniforms. 35 The bona fide
occupational qualification argument arises out of Section 703(e) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ an individual on the basis of his sex in those certain instances where sex is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. 36 The Sage
Realty court dismissed the defendants' contention that the wearing of
a sexually revealing Bicentennial uniform was a BFOQ, stating that
the wearing of sexually provocative clothing was clearly not an
occupational qualification or the position of office building lobby
attendant.37
b. Sexual Harassmentby Non-Employees in General
The dress code cases demonstrate that employers can be held
liable for sexual harassment by nonemployees.3s In those cases, the
vocative outfits. Finally, in Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986), the court
held that the plaintiff established a prima facie violation of Title VII by demonstrating that her
employer terminated her employment as cocktail lounge waitress because she refused to wear

sexually provocative attire.
34. See, for example, Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 609 (stating that Sage argued that
requiring Hasselman to wear the bicentennial uniform was an appropriate exercise of its right
to require an employee to work in company-prescribed attire); Newtown Inn, 647 F. Supp. at 961
(stating that the employer claimed a bona fide occupational qualification defense).
35. 507 F. Supp. at 608-09 (quoting EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 87 F.R.D. 365, 371 (S.D.
N.Y. 1980)). See also id. at 609 n.15 (discussing circuit court decisions holding that Title VII
does not prohibit an employer from making reasonable employment decisions based on factors
such as grooming and dress); Marentette, 506 F. Supp. at 911 (agreeing with the decision in
Sage Realty that there is a difference between reasonable employment decisions based on
factors such as grooming and dress, and unreasonable ones).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988). For a further discussion of
BFOQ in the context of the Hooters allegations, see Part W.C.
37. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 611 (noting that "[ilndeed, the evidence establishes that
wearing the uniform interfered with Hasselman's ability to perform her job").
38. See Aalberts and Seidman, 21 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 453 (cited in note 24) (discussing

collected cases).
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employers encouraged sexual harassment by requiring their female
employees to wear sexually provocative attire. 9 Subsequent cases
and EEOC Guidelines have established, moreover, that employers can
be held liable for the sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees, even in the absence of an employer-imposed sexually provocative dress code.
The Supreme Court stated in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
that 'Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."4° This
statement can be interpreted as imposing a duty upon employers to
maintain a workplace that is free of sexual harassment; it does not
distinguish harassing conduct by employers and co-workers from
harassment by nonemployees. 41 Furthermore, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Sex Discrimination 42 provide
that an employer may be liable for the sexual harassment of employees in the workplace by nonemployees when the employer or its supervisory employees knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. 43 The
Guidelines note further that in determining whether an employer is
liable for harassment, one should consider any control or other legal
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of the nonemployees.4 Although the EEOC Guidelines are not
legally binding on courts, the Supreme Court has afforded them sig45
nificant weight under certain circumstances.
39.
40.

Id.
477 U.S. at 65.

41. Aalberts and Seidman, 21 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 454 (cited in note 24) (arguing by
analogy that an employer's Title VII duty will extend to harassment by non-employees).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1994) The Guidelines were promulgated to assist courts in sexual
harassment cases. EEOC ComplianceManual § 615, 1 3114 at 3267 (CCH, 1991).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1994).
44. Id. The EEOC Compliance Manual describes the situation of a male customer touching a waitress and telling her that what he wanted was not on the menu, as an example of a
situation in which the employer may be responsible if it learned of the conduct and failed to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action within its control. EEOC Compliance Manual §
615.3(e), 1 3102 at 3209 (cited in note 42). The Manual suggests that, depending on the
circumstances, appropriate corrective action might be as simple as switching table assignments
to have a waiter finish serving that table. Id. The ComplianceManual also states that whether
an employer is ultimately responsible for harassment by a nonemployee "will depend on the
relationship between the employer and the non-employee as revealed by the specific factual
context in which the allegedly unlawful conduct occurred." Id. at 3210.
45. The Court stated in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), that
interpretations and opinions by the EEOC under Title VII constitute a "body of experience and
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." See also Aalberts and
Seidman, 21 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 457 (cited in note 24) (describing the Supreme Court's
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In recent years, several courts have relied on the EEOC
Guidelines in holding that employers may be liable for the sexual
harassment of employees by nonemployees. In Powell v. Las Vegas
Hilton Corp.,46 a "21" dealer alleged that customers had stared at her
for extended periods and told her that she had "great legs" or "great
tits," and that her employer had discharged her for complaining about
this harassment.47 In denying the employer's motion for summary
judgment, the court held that an employer may be liable for the sexual harassment of its employees by nonemployees, including customers.48 Similarly, in Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc. 49 and

Hernandez v. Miranda Velez, 50 courts held that an employer may be
liable for the sexual harassment of an employee by a nonemployee if
the employer knew of the harassment and failed to take corrective
action to remedy the situation. In addition, several federal courts of
appeal have stated in dicta that employers may be liable for the sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees.51
In conclusion, the current law regarding hostile work environment sexual harassment and harassment by nonemployees demonstrates that an employer such as Hooters, which requires its employees to wear sexually provocative uniforms and which features a
"sexually charged" atmosphere in which male customers may feel free
to make sexual comments to waitresses, may be liable under Title VII
for the sexual harassment of its waitresses by its customers. 52 The
question remains, however, whether Hooters waitresses can and
should be said to have "assumed the risk" of some harassing conduct
by customers, such that Hooters would not be liable.
approach toward the EEOC Guidelines). The Supreme Court relied on the EEOC Guidelines in
deciding Meritor. 477 U.S. at 65.
46. 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992).
47. Id. at 1025-26.
48. Id. at 1027-28. The court referred to the statement of the Meritor Court that Title VII
provides employees the right to work in an environment free of discriminatory intimidation and
ridicule. Id. at 1028.
49. 808 F. Supp. 500, 513 (E.D. Va. 1992).
50. 1994 WL 394855 at *8 (D. Puerto Rico).
51. See, for example, Whitaker v. Carney, 778 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) for the proposition that "such duty may obtain as to actions of
nonemployees in the workplace"); Garziano v. E.L DuPontde Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 387
(5th Cir. 1987) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) in support of its statement that "federal law
imposes a specific duty upon employers to protect the workplace and the workers from sexual
harassment, including redressing known occurrences of sexual harassment"); Henson, 682 F.2d
at 910 (noting that "[tihe environment in which an employee works can be rendered offensive in
an equal degree by the acts of supervisors, coworkers, or even strangers to the workplace"
(citations omitted)).
52. The Hooters plantiffs alleged that Hooters knew of the harassment of its waitresses by
its customers. Complaint at 18 (cited in note 1).
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B. Assumption of Risk
Assumption of risk is an affirmative tort defense, the general
principle of which is that a plaintiff who knowingly and voluntarily
assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct
of a defendant is barred from recovery for that harm. 53 It is generally
recognized as taking two forms: express assumption of risk and implied assumption of risk.54 Express assumption of risk arises when
the plaintiff evidences her express consent to incur a known risk by
written or spoken word.55 Implied assumption of risk arises when the
56
plaintiff evidences her consent to incur the risk by her conduct.
The basis of the assumption of risk defense is the plaintiffs
consent.57 In particular, the defense is based on the plaintiffs express
or implied agreement to shift the legal responsibility for possible
injury from the negligent defendant onto the plaintiff, thus relieving
the defendant of liability.58 This agreement can be shown by an exculpatory contract or simply by the plaintiffs actions in voluntarily
engaging in some activities, such as contact sports.59 The plaintiffs
53. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A (1965) ("Restatement (Second)"). The court in
Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 31-32 (8th Cir. 1990), explained the defense of assumption of risk
in the employment context as follows:
Assumption of risk, in the law of master and servant, is a phrase commonly used to describe a term or condition in the contract of employment, ... by which the employee
agrees that certain dangers of injury, while he is engaged in the service for which he is
hired, shall be at the risk of the employee. Assumption of risk generally bars recovery
by an employee who knows of the danger in a situation but nevertheless voluntarily exposes himself to that danger.... [The essence of [assumption of risk) is venturousness;
it implies intentional exposure to a known danger....
54. See, for example, Restatement (Second) §§ 496B and 4960 (defining express and
implied assumption of risk).
55. Paul Resenlund and Paul Killion, Once a Wicked Sister: The Continuing Role of
Assumption ofRisk Under ComparativeFaultin California,20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 225, 233 (1986).
56. Id. The plaintiff implies by her conduct that she consents to the defendant's negligence or recklessness and agrees to take her own chances. W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs,
Robert E. Keeton, and David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68 at 481
(West, 5th ed. 1984) ("Prosserand Keeton on Torts"). See also Restatement (Second) § 496C,
comment b (stating "[the plaintiff does not ... expressly consent to accept the risk of harm
arising from the defendant's conduct; but by voluntarily electing to proceed, with knowledge of
the risk, in a manner which will expose him to it, he manifests his willingness to accept it, and
to take his chances as to harm which may result from it. He is therefore barred from recovery
as if he had expressly consented").
57. Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 68 at 484. See also Resenlund and Killion, 20 U.S.F. L.
Rev. at 243 (stating that the basis of assumption of risk is the plaintiffs consent); Restatement
(Second) § 496C, comment h (stating that the basis of assumption of risk is consent to accept the
risk).
58. Rosenlund and Killion, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. at 243-44.
59. Id. at 244-45 (citing, for example, Kuehner v. Green, 436 S.2d 78, 81 (Fla. 1983)
(participant in karate match deemed to have consented to risk of negligent kick); Kabella v.
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agreement to waive liability if the defendant is negligent allows the
defendant to engage in conduct which the plaintiff desires without
fear of liability.6 0 Proponents of assumption of risk contend that the

operation of the defense, denying recovery by a plaintiff who has
consented to a risk created by the negligence of the defendant, simply
enforces the plaintiff's agreement. 61 This enforcement of the plaintiffs agreement is in the interest of plaintiffs as a class, because if
plaintiffs are not bound by their promises, future defendants will no
longer engage in conduct desired by future plaintiffs due to fear of
liability.62 These concepts underlying the defense of assumption of
risk are "fundamental to a society which places great weight upon the
individual's freedom of choice. '63
Tort law has established limits to the defense of assumption of
risk. For example, courts have refused to give effect to some express
agreements by which the plaintiff assumed a risk or to recognize
implied assumption of risk, when allowing the plaintiff to assume the
risk is contrary to public policy.6 Courts are generally concerned with
protecting particular classes of people from those who may take unfair advantage of them.65 An express agreement for the assumption of
risk will not, in general, be enforced, and conduct will not, in general,
be found to constitute implied assumption of risk when the defendant

Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d. 290, 294 (1983) (participant in tackle football game deemed
to have consented to risk of negligent tackle)).
60. Rosenlund and Killion, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. at 245.
61. Id.
62. Id. Drag racing is an example of a risky activity that some people may want to experience. A racetrack owner is likely to have participants sign an express agreement assuming the
risks of certain injuries that they may sustain while drag racing. Even if the participants do not
sign a waiver, they may be viewed as impliedly assuming the risk by choosing to drag race,
because drag racing seems to be an activity in which any reasonable person must recognize
certain risks. If courts do not enforce the participants' agreement to assume the risk of certain
injuries, the racetrack owner will be unable to afford to continue to provide the drag racing
experience to interested persons because the risk of financial liability will be too great.
Therefore, because of the failure to enforce some participants' assumption of risk, other interested persons will no longer be able to experience the activity. See Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16
Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821, 828 (1972) (holding that the plaintiff expressly assumed the risk of
injuries at the defendant's racetrack). For a discussion of this point in the context of the
Hooters lawsuits, see text accompanying notes 159-62.
63. Rosenlund and Killon, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. at 245.
64. See Restatement (Second) § 496B, comment j (stating that an express agreement by
the plaintiff to assume the risk will not be enforced if the defendant's superior bargaining
position impaired the plaintiffs free choice) and § 496C, commentj (stating that the same public
policy considerations invalidating some express assumptions of risk may also invalidate implied
assumptions of risk).
65. Id. § 496C, commentj.
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has such greater bargaining power than the plaintiff that their
66
agreement does not represent the plaintiffs free choice.
The knowing and voluntary elements of implied assumption of
risk are additional means courts use to limit the defense. 67 A plaintiff will not be found to have impliedly assumed the risk of harm arising from the defendant's conduct unless she knew of the existence of
the risk and appreciated its nature, character, and extent.6 The
standard is subjective, and considers what a particular plaintiff in
fact knew and understood.69 There are some risks, however, that are
so clear and obvious that no one will be believed if they say they did
70
not understand them.

For the defense of assumption of risk to apply, the plaintiff
must accept the risk voluntarily.71 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides that the plaintiffs acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the
defendant's negligence has left the plaintiff no reasonable alternative.72 The comments to the Restatement provide further, however,
66. Id. § 496B, comment j and § 4960, comment j. One relationship in which courts
generally find such a disparity of bargaining power that they will not allow a plaintiff to assume
the risk of harm is when the defendant and plaintiff are employer and employee, as economic
necessity may force employees to agree to assume risks. Id. § 496C, commentj.
67. See Ann K. Bradley, Note, Knight v. Jewett- ReasonableImplied Assumption of Risk
as a Complete Defense in Sports Injury Cases, 28 San Diego L. Rev. 477, 496 (1991) (stating that
a court can fulfill its public policy aims by narrowly defining the terms knowing and voluntary).
See also Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 68 at 486-87 (cited in note 56) (stating that the defense of
assumption of risk is quite narrowly restricted by the requirement that the risk assumption be
knowing and voluntary). Restatement (Second) § 4960 defines implied assumption of risk as
follows: a plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself caused by the defendant's
conduct or by the condition of the defendant's property, and who nevertheless voluntarily
chooses to enter or remain within the area of that risk, under circumstances showing his
willingness to accept the risk, is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk.
68. Restatement (Second) § 496D.
69. Id., comment c; Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 68 at 487 (cited in note 56). If the
plaintiff does not understand the risk involved in a situation because of his lack of information,
experience, or judgment, he will not be found to have assumed the risk. Restatement (Second) §
496D, comment c.
70. Restatement (Second) § 496D, comment d. Examples of risks that anyone of adult age
must be found to appreciate include: slipping on ice, lifting heavy objects, flammable
substances, falling through unguarded openings, driving a car with faulty brakes, and
unguarded dangerous machinery. See Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 68 at 488. In the usual
case, the plaintiffs "knowledge and appreciation of the danger will be a question for the jury;
but where it is clear that any person in his position must have understood the danger, the issue
may be decided by the court." Id. at 489.
71. Restatement (Second) § 496E.
72. Id. One such case involved a plaintiff who, knowing that the floor was defective,
entered the outhouse provided by her landlord and fell into the pit below. Rush v. Commercial
Realty Co., 7 N.J. Misc. 337, 145 A. 476, 476 (1929). The court held that the plaintiff "had no
choice, when impelled by the calls of nature, but to use the facilities placed at her disposal by
the landlord," and thus did not voluntarily assume the risk of injury. Id.
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that the plaintiffs acceptance of the risk is to be considered voluntary
when the plaintiff is acting under the compulsion of circumstances
that leave him no reasonable alternatives, as long as those circumstances were not caused by the defendant's tortious conduct.73
There has long been controversy surrounding the defense of
assumption of risk, particularly in the employment context. Use of
the defense reached its height during the Industrial Revolution, when
it was used to insulate employers from the cost of on-the-job injuries
to employees, in order to "encourage industrial undertakings by making the burden upon them as light as possible."74 In applying the doctrine, courts reasoned that, because workers were not forced to remain at any given job, they assumed the risk of working at a dangerous one. 75 Assumption of risk, contributory negligence, 76 and the fellow servant rule77 were known as "the three wicked sisters of the
common law," because of the great obstacles they posed to recovery for
industrial accidents. 78 Because of the growing belief that workers
need protection, today the defense of assumption of risk has been
almost entirely
eliminated in the employment setting through labor
79
legislation.

73. Restatement (Second) § 496E, comment b.
74. See Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 80 at 571-72 (cited in note 56). See also Rosenlund
and Killion, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. at 226 (cited in note 55) (referring to the use of the defense to
"insulate nineteenth century capitalists from the 'human overhead' of their developing industries").
75. Jane P. North, Comment, Employees'Assumption ofRisk: Real or Illusory Choice?, 52
Tenn. L. Rev. 35, 40 (1984). The problem with this reasoning was that most employees had no
real choice of a safe place to work. The working conditions in many industries were extremely
inhumane, and this use of the assumption of risk defense meant that employers had no incentive to improve working conditions. Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 80 at 573.
76. The contributory negligence rule prevented employees from recovering for injuries
caused by their own failure to exercise reasonable care for their safety. Prosserand Keeton on
Torts § 80 at 569.
77. The fellow servant rule prevented employees from recovering from their employer for
injuries caused solely by the negligence of a fellow servant. Id. § 80 at 571.
78. Id. § 80 at 573. Under the common law system, which relied on the three defenses,
the vast majority of industrial accidents were uncompensated, and "the burden fell upon the
worker, who was least able to support it." Id. § 80 at 572.
79. North, 52 Tenn. L. Rev. at 42 (cited in note 75). By 1949, every state had enacted a
workers' compensation statute. Id. Such statutes rest upon a theory of social insurance rather
than tort liability. Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 80 at 568. The worker gives up her right to
sue her employer for work-related industries at common law in exchange for the fixed and
certain compensation awards set by the statute. North, 52 Tenn. L. Rev. at 42. Workers'
compensation is a form of strict liability for the employer, who has no common law defenses.
Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 80 at 573. The assumption of risk defense was eroded further by
other state legislative action, such as hazardous occupations employer's liability acts and acts
abrogating the defense in certain employment contexts. North, 52 Tenn. L. Rev. at 43-44.
The viability of the defense of assumption of risk in general, not just in the employment
context, has been uncertain since the replacement of contributory negligence by comparative
fault in almost every state. See generally John L. Diamond, Assumption of Risk After
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The same broad theory underlies both the decline of the defense of assumption of risk and the rise of Title VII. Assumption of
risk has fallen into disfavor and Title VII has flourished because of
the beliefs that workers need the protection of the state and that the
market operating alone does not sufficiently protect the interests of
workers. 80 Assumption of risk was clearly abused as a defense during
the Industrial Revolution, and its decline in the employment context
has generally benefited workers81 Similarly, Title VII has benefited
workers by recognizing that state intervention is necessary to eliminate discrimination in employment.82 This Note argues, however,
that the law can go too far in protecting workers, with the result that
workers are limited in their ability to choose the type of environment
in which they work.8 3 The expansion of sexual harassment law in
particular poses an additional danger for women: that they will be
viewed as perpetual victims who always need the protection of the
state, rather than as free thinkers who can accept responsibility for
their choices.8 This Note contends that a limited assumption of risk
defense in sexual harassment law would avoid these dangers, allowing individuals to choose to work in sexually charged environments
and recognizing that employees can and should face the consequences
of their choices.

Comparative Negligence: Integrating Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 Ohio St. L. J. 717
(1991); Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of
Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 213 (1987); Rosenlund and Killion, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 225 (cited
in note 55). While contributory negligence, like assumption of risk, is a complete defense; under
comparative fault, a plaintiffs negligence results in only a partial deduction from recovery,
depending upon the relative culpability of the defendant and the plaintiff. Diamond, 52 Ohio St.
L. J. at 719-20. Courts and commentators have reached several different conclusions on the
issue of whether assumption of risk should be subjected to the apportionment principles of

comparative negligence. See id. at 720-25 (exploring ways to reconcile assumption of risk and
comparative negligence).
80. See Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 80 at 572-73 (discussing the motivations behind the
statutory changes in the law which nearly eliminated the assumption of risk defense in the
employment setting); McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1972)
(stating that the purpose of Title VII was "to assure equality of employment opportunities and
to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified

job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens").
81.

See notes 74-79 and accompanying text.

82. See, for example, Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that "[o]ne can
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers" (cited
approvingly in Meritor,477 U.S. at 66)).
83. See notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
84. See Part V-A.
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C. DistinguishingAssumption of Risk From the Unwelcomeness
Element of CurrentSexual HarassmentLaw
The assumption of risk defense is similar to the unwelcomeness element of hostile work environment sexual harassment. Both
focus on the plaintiffs conduct, rather than the defendant's, to potentially relieve the defendant from liability. While several commentators have criticized this aspect of the unwelcomeness element,85 another has approved it, noting that the element recognizes that women
can and, in some circumstances, should protect themselves from sexual harassment, rather than assuming the role of victim.86 Both the
assumption of risk defense and the unwelcomeness element provide
that a plaintiff who has indicated her willingness for the defendant to
engage in certain conduct should not be allowed to complain about the
defendant's conduct later, whether the plaintiff voluntarily chooses to
encounter a known risk and consents not to hold the defendant liable
for any injury from that risk, or engages in conduct that indicates that
87
sexual comments or advances are invited and not offensive.
One difference between assumption of risk and unwelcomeness
involves the burden of proof. Assumption of risk is an affirmative
defense the defendant must plead and prove.88
Proof of
unwelcomeness, however, is part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 89
More importantly, assumption of risk and unwelcomeness differ
substantively. The basis of the assumption of risk defense is consent.
Harassing conduct must, by definition, be unwelcome to constitute
sexual harassment. 90 If the conduct is unwelcome and is thus
harassment, how can the plaintiff be said to have consented to it, in
order to have assumed the risk of the harassment? The necessary
distinction is that for assumption of risk purposes, a court must find
that the plaintiff consented merely to the risk of the conduct, not to
the conduct itself. In other words, she accepted the risk of the conduct because she found that the probable benefits of a certain activity
85. See, for example, Christina A. Bull, The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a
Sexual HarassmentPlaintiffs Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 117, 147 (1993) (stating that "admitting evidence of a woman's dress
and speech necessarily focuses the trial inquiry on the conduct of the plaintiff rather than of the
defendant... [and] encourages blaming the victim for the offense committed against her").
86. Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigmfor Sexual Harassment: Toward the Optimal Level of
Loss, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 427, 473 (1994).
87. See notes 13 and 53 and accompanying text.
88. Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 68 at 494 (cited in note 56).
89. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (stating that the employee must show that the harassing
conduct was unwelcome).
90. See id.
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outweighed the likely risks, and she voluntarily entered into the risky
activity. This consent to assume the risk of the harassing conduct is
distinguishable from consenting to or welcoming the conduct itself.
The latter is what is required for harassing conduct to be welcome,
and thus not to constitute actionable sexual harassment. In short, in
the sexual harassment context, finding that the plaintiff assumed the
risk of sexual harassment means that she consented to bear the risk
of certain harassing conduct, even that which she found offensive and
unwelcome at the time it occurred.
We can draw an analogy to a situation where an individual is
commonly said to have assumed the risk of injury, football.9 1 When a
person plays football, courts generally say that the mere fact that they
entered into the game indicates that they impliedly consented to
assume the risk of some injury.92 Their conduct suggests that they
consented to the risk of injury because they believed that the fun of
the game outweighed its potential risk. Their conduct does not suggest, however, that they welcomed or invited the injury itself or that
they indicated that an injury would be desirable.
The distinction between welcomeness and assumption of risk
was muddied by the Supreme Court's statement in Meritor that a
plaintiff's sexually provocative speech or dress is relevant in determining whether she found particular sexual advances welcome. 93 A
plaintiff's sexually provocative speech or dress, if shown to be directed
at a particular co-worker or customer (probably a rare situation), may
be useful in demonstrating that she invited his advances or indicated
that she would find his advances desirable. Such evidence thus may
show that she welcomed his advances and that the advances did not
constitute sexual harassment. On the other hand, evidence that a
plaintiff used sexual language or dressed provocatively, but where
there is no showing that the plaintiff directed this behavior at one or
more individuals (probably a more common situation), does not seem
to be very probative that she welcomed the advances of any particular
person.94 Rather, evidence of such behavior by the plaintiff seems
91. See, for example, Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290, 294 (1983)
(participant in tackle football game deemed to have consented to the risk of a negligent tackle).
92. Id. at 292 (stating that "[vloluntary participation in a football game constitutes an
implied consent to normal risks attendant to bodily contact permitted by the rules of the sport").
93. 477 U.S. at 69.
94. A major criticism of the unwelcomeness defense in sexual harassment law is the
contention that women generally do not dress to attract men, and therefore it is erroneous to
use their dress as evidence that they welcomed sexual conduct. Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She
Ask for It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 Cornell L. Rev.
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more appropriate to demonstrate that she assumed the risk of harassing conduct: she voluntarily acted or dressed provocatively, knowing
that doing so would create a risk of sexual advances from her coworkers and customers. In short, evidence of the plaintiff's provocative speech or dress, which the Meritor court held was admissible to
show welcomeness, seems generally more relevant to show assumption of risk. 95 Commentators, recognizing that such evidence tends
not to be very probative as to whether the plaintiff truly welcomed the
harassing conduct and tends to be very prejudicial to the plaintiff,
have argued that the Meritor court erred in stating that such evidence
is generally relevant as to welcomeness and have criticized the very
96
existence of the welcomeness element.
Welcomeness and assumption of risk are two distinct defenses
to a claim of sexual harassment, 97 and each plays a useful role if limited to its proper scope.9 8 The plaintiff will meet the unwelcomeness
element of a sexual harassment claim if she can show that she did not
solicit or incite the harassing conduct and that she regarded the con-

1558, 1585 (1992). Even if a woman does dress to look attractive to a particular man, that does
not mean that she welcomes sexual attention from all men. Id. at 1585-86. "Unless her actions
or dress clearly indicate a desire for sexual conduct with the alleged harasser, there is no basis
for believing that a woman's desire to engage in sexual conduct with a specific person is indicated by her dress or general speech." Id. (emphasis added).
The justification for a welcomeness element provided by the EEOC in its Meritor anicus
brief supports the contention that evidence of a plaintiffs dress or speech that is not directed at
any particular person is not probative as to welcomeness. The EEOC stated that a welcomeness
element was needed to "ensure that sexual harassment charges do not become a tool by which
one party to a consensual sexual relationship may punish the other." Id. at 1575 (quoting Brief
for EEOC, Meritor (No. 84-1979)). This statement suggests that evidence showing that the
plaintiff was trying to attract a particular person should be relevant as to welcomeness.
Contrary to the Meritor court, the statement does not suggest that general evidence of a
plaintiffs speech and dress is relevant to show that the plaintiff welcomed the advances of any
person, thus barring her sexual harassment claim.
95. While it is arguable that evidence of a plaintiffs provocative speech or dress could be
used to demonstrate that she assumed the risk of sexual harassment and thus should be barred
from recovery, this Note contends that any assumption of risk defense in sexual harassment law
should be narrow, in order to achieve the goals of Title VII. See Part IV. This Note proposes an
assumption of risk defense that is limited only to the specific situation of a plaintiff who works
for an employer that sells sex appeal as a substantial part of its business and who offers sex
appeal as a substantial part of her particular job. This proposed assumption of risk defense
would therefore be unavailable to employers who do not have sex appeal as a substantial part of
their business, but who want to argue that the plaintiffs sexually provocative speech or dress is
relevant to show that she assumed the risk of sexual harassment.
96. See generally Bull, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 117 (cited in note 85); Juliano, 77 Cornell L. Rev.
1558 (cited in note 94).
97. Assumption of risk is, of course, not a defense that currently exists in sexual harassment law.
98. See Part VA (discussing the advantages of the assumption of risk defense).
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duct as undesirable or offensive." The assumption of risk defense
only becomes relevant after the plaintiff has demonstrated unwelcome
sexual harassment. This Note, focusing on the allegations of the
Hooters lawsuits, argues that, even if a plaintiff succeeds in showing
that she did not welcome the harassing conduct at the time it occurred, she should still be unable to win her sexual harassment claim
if the defendant can show that the plaintiff assumed the risk of sexual
harassment and that her job is one in which allowing employees to
assume the risk of sexual harassment is not contrary to public policy.
III. ANALYSIS OF AN ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEFENSE TO THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN THE HOOTERS LAWSUITS

A. The Allegations of the HootersLawsuits
The Hooters lawsuits alleged several different types of sexually
harassing conduct that contributed to a hostile work environment.
One allegation involved conduct by the Hooters management and
male employees. The lawsuits alleged that the management and male
employees subjected female employees to derogatory language and
unwelcome sexual commentaries about their bodies, including managers making statements about the size of waitresses' breasts, referring to a waitress as having "DSL"--dick-sucking lips, and nicknaming a waitress "Clitoris.' ' oo The lawsuits alleged further that Hooters
management imposed unwelcome sexual contacts on waitresses, including attempting to have sex with them, grabbing them on the buttocks and groin area, and subjecting them to involuntary
"massages."' l Other allegations included that managers conferred
special rewards on waitresses who provided them with sexual favors,
and that managers intimidated waitresses about their bodies. 0 2
Another type of sexual harassment alleged by the lawsuits was
harassing conduct by Hooters customers. The lawsuits alleged that
Hooters established a working environment in which its customers

99. As discussed above, evidence of the plaintiffs sexually provocative speech and dress,
contrary to the statements of the Meritor court, is typically not relevant to the welcomeness
issue. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
100. Complaint at 4 (cited in note 1).
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 5, 7.
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were encouraged to make sexual comments and advances to its waitresses.103 Some specific examples proffered were: the name of the
restaurant (a slang term for women's breasts); waitresses referred to
as "Hooters girls"; management's directions for waitresses to smile at
the hoots and leers of male customers; Hooters' displays. of sexist
menus, pictures, calendars, and signs on the work premises in view of
customers; and Hooters' requirement that female employees wear
sexually provocative uniforms. 104 The lawsuits also alleged that
Hooters' tolerance and encouragement of sexual communications and
requirement of a sexually provocative employee uniform caused waitresses to be subjected to unwelcome sexual communications by customers, including "I want to order your hooters," asking waitresses to
"show me your hooters," making comments about women's breasts
and buttocks, and staring at and making passes at waitresses.105 Yet
another type of sexual harassment alleged by the lawsuits involved
the nature of the workplace in general: a place where women's bodies
were used for the sexual entertainment of men. 1 6
The lawsuits alleged further that the plaintiffs were offended
by the harassment and gave notice to Defendant Hooters of the unwelcome sexual conduct and communications, but that Hooters failed
10 7
to take prompt or adequate remedial action.
B. Analysis of the Hooters Allegations Under Hostile Work
Environment Sexual HarassmentLaw
The facts alleged in the Hooters lawsuits seem likely to constitute a hostile and offensive working environment. All of the necessary elements of a hostile work environment sexual harassment
0 8 appear to be met.
claim, as laid out in Henson v. City of Dundee,1

103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 11.
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id. at 8-9. The lawsuits provided examples of the exploitation of women's bodies in the
workplace, such as: defendants' choice of Hooters as the name for their restaurant; a framed
poster of a Playboy magazine cover with "Hooters" written across a woman's naked breasts was
hung on the wall greeting all employees; a sign at the restaurant entrance stated "Men: no
shirts, no shoes: no service. Women: no shirt: free food"; waitresses were required to wear
sexually provocative uniforms; waitresses were required to hula hoop at the request of customers; and managers pulled female employees' T-shirts tight and tied them in the back so the
women's breasts would bulge out the top. Id.
107. Id. at 18.
108. 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982). See notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
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The plaintiffs clearly belong to a protected group. 0 9 It also seems
clear that the harassment complained of was based upon sex. 10
The requirement that the plaintiffs must have been subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment is not as obviously met. The allegations demonstrate that the plaintiffs were subject to sexual harassment;"' the more difficult issue is whether the harassing conduct was
unwelcome. The lawsuits alleged that the conduct was unwelcome,
but the EEOC Guidelines and several courts indicate that one should
examine the totality of the circumstances in determining whether
conduct was unwelcomel2 in the sense that the employee did not
solicit or incite the conduct and the employee regarded the conduct as
offensive." 3 As discussed previously, the holding of the Meritor court
that evidence of the plaintiff's sexually provocative speech or dress is
"obviously relevant" to welcomeness has encouraged courts to broaden
their view of welcomeness, admitting evidence that is not probative of
whether the plaintiff welcomed the harassing conduct but rather
suggests that she assumed the risk of any harassment she suffered."1
Under this broad view of welcomeness, it could be argued that the
plaintiffs' decision to work at Hooters, a place named after a slang
term for women's breasts, where the waitresses must wear sexually
provocative attire, suggests that the harassing conduct was not un-

109. In all cases of sexual discrimination, the membership in a protected group element
simply requires a stipulation that the employee is a man or a woman. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
110. Id. As the Henson court explained, in a case in which a male supervisor makes sexual
overtures to a female worker, it is usually obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees similarly. The allegations of the Hooters lawsuits, that the male management, employees, and customers made unwelcome sexual comments about the waitresses' bodies, such as "I
want to order your hooters," and imposed sexual contacts upon waitresses, seem equally based
upon the sex of the waitresses. See Complaint at 4, 12 (cited in note 1). It is highly unlikely
that male employees were subjected to such behavior.
111. The Henson court described sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature." Id.
(quoting the EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981)). Management, male employees,
and customers were all alleged to have made sexual comments to the waitresses, management
was alleged to have physically touched the waitresses in a sexual way, and customers were
alleged to have made sexual advances to the waitresses. See generally Complaint.
112. See EEOC Compliance Manual, § 615 at 3270 (CCH, 1990); Downer v. Federal
Aviation Administration, 775 F.2d 288, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "the offensiveness of
conduct cannot be judged simply by proving that an incident involving sexual remarks occurred
without considering the context").
113. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
114. See Juliano, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1585-92 (cited in note 94) (arguing that evidence of a
woman's speech and dress is rarely probative that she welcomed sexual behavior, and stating
that evidence of the plaintiff's past conduct "may invite juries to punish women for past expressions of sexuality or to incorrectly infer that sexual expression with one person invites sexual
expression with all").
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welcome, that the plaintiffs solicited such conduct or indicated that
they did not find such conduct offensive.11 5 The plaintiffs' choice of
where to work, however, does not seem very probative of whether they
welcomed harassing conduct from any particular employee or customer of Hooters, and seems more relevant to a determination of
whether they assumed the risk of sexual harassment.116 In addition,
the broad view of welcomeness seems inappropriate in light of the
reasons why an unwelcomeness standard was advocated." 7 Finally, a
highly relevant factor in the unwelcomeness determination is whether
8
the plaintiff complained about the harassing conduct.1
Commentators have argued that a woman's conduct should never
outweigh her words: If a plaintiff affirmatively told her harassers
that she found their conduct offensive, this statement should be
dispositive as to unwelcomeness." 9 The Hooters lawsuits allege that
the plaintiffs continually complained about harassing conduct.120 The
alleged complaints arguably outweigh any welcomeness that may
have been suggested by their decision to work at Hooters, and demonstrate that the conduct was indeed unwelcome.
The next required element, that the harassment be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to affect the terms and conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment, also appears to be satisfied by the allegations in the Hooters lawsuits. The Harris Court

115. The allegations of the Hooters lawsuits are distinguishable from the facts of Burns v.
McGregor Electronic Industries,Inc., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993). In Burns, the district court
ruled against the plaintiff, despite the "grisly and shocking facts supporting a finding of unwelcome sexual harassment," because the plaintiff had previously appeared in provocative photos
in a lewd magazine. Id. at 961. The district court reasoned that a person who would appear
nude in a magazine would not be offended by the conduct at issue in the case. The Eighth
Circuit reversed, holding that "[tlhe plaintiffs choice to pose for a nude magazine outside work
hours is not material to the issue of whether plaintiff found her employer's work-related conduct
offensive. This is not a case where Burns posed in provocative and suggestive ways at work."
Id. at 963. The sexually provocative behavior of the plaintiff in Burns was not work-related, and
thus the court held it was not relevant as to whether the plaintiff found her employer's conduct
offensive. Id. The Hooters plaintiffs, however, chose to work at a place where sexually provocative attire was required of the waitstaff. This was therefore work-related, and thus arguably could be relevant as to whether the plaintiffs solicited the harassing conduct and/or found
it offensive. See Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Utah 1987) (holding that
"evidence relating to the work environment ... is obviously relevant if such conduct was known
to [the] defendant").
116. Part II.C discusses the application of assumption of risk concepts to the Hooters allegations.
117. See note 94.
118. See EEOC Compliance Manual, § 615 at 3270 (cited in note 112) (stating that "[wihere
there is some indication of welcomeness... the charging party's claim will be strengthened if
she made a contemporaneous complaint or protest").
119. See, for example, Bull, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 151 (cited in note 85).
120. Complaint at 13 (cited in note 1).
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stated that whether an environment is hostile can be determined only
by looking at the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, and whether the
conduct unreasonably interfered with an employee's work performance. 121 At Hooters, alleged harassment by management, coworkers,
and customers certainly appeared to be frequent. Some of the conduct
appeared to be quite severe and physically threatening, especially the
allegations that managers grabbed intimate areas of the body of one
of the plaintiffs, and that a manager attempted to have sex with another. 122 The allegations that the plaintiffs were forced to resign due
to the unrelenting harassment and that they suffered severe mental
anguish and emotional distress as a result of the harassment,23 suggest that the harassment unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs'
work performance.
Finally, the allegations in the Hooters lawsuits also appear to
satisfy the requirement that the employer be responsible for the harassing conduct. With respect to harassing conduct by supervisors and
co-workers, an employer is liable for a sexually hostile environment if
the employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment
and failed to prevent the harassment or to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.124 The Hooters lawsuits alleged that the

defendant knew or should have known of the harassing conduct by
the plaintiffs' supervisors and co-workers;25 and the harassment alleged was so pervasive and severe that it seems that Hooters certainly
should have known of it.126 The lawsuits also allege that Hooters had
actual knowledge of the harassment because of the plaintiffs' contin-

121. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
122. Complaint at 5 (cited in note 1).
123. Id. at 18.
124. Lindemanm and Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law at 191-92 (cited in
note 8). For an in-depth analysis of employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors, see
generally Glen A. Staszewski, Note, UsingAgency Principlesfor Guidance in FindingEmployer
Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Harassment, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1057
(1995).
125. Complaint at 9-10 (cited in note 1).
126. Lindemann and Kadue, Sexual Harassmentin Employment Law at 159 (cited in note

8) (stating that "[k]nowledge of sexual harassment may be imputed to the employer as a matter

of law if it is openly practiced in the workplace or well-known among employees"); Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 906 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that "there was sufficient
evidence in the record from which it could be inferred that the [sexually hostile] atmosphere

described by the plaintiff was so blatant as to put the defendants on constructive notice that sex
discrimination permeated the [General Surgery Residency Training] Program").
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ual complaints and that Hooters made no effort to stop the harass27
ment.1
The EEOC Guidelines and case law provide that an employer
may be liable for the sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees if it knows or should have known of the harassment and failed
to take corrective action. 128 As with the harassment by their supervisors and co-workers, the plaintiffs complained about harassment by
customers, and Hooters allegedly failed to take any action to stop the
harassment. 129 In addition, the allegations suggest that Hooters
should be responsible for the customers' conduct because Hooters
established an environment in which customers were encouraged to
make sexual comments and advances to waitresses. Furthermore,
Sage Realty and the other dress code cases demonstrate that Hooters
could be found liable for the sexual harassment of waitresses by customers based solely on the fact that Hooters required its waitresses to
3
wear sexually provocative uniforms." 1
C. Analysis of the Hooters Allegations Under Assumption of Risk
As discussed above, the allegations of the Hooters lawsuits
appear to support a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment. To examine the usefulness of an assumption of risk defense
in cases involving sexually charged workplaces, this Note next considers whether the Hooters plaintiffs can be said to have assumed the
risk of any of the harassing conduct alleged, such that they should
have been barred from recovery for any harm caused by that conduct.
The general principle of the tort defense of assumption of risk is that
a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a known risk of harm arising from
the defendant's conduct is barred from recovery for that harm. 131 The
doctrine of assumption of risk, if imported into sexual harassment
law, would provide that a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a known
risk of sexual harassment arising from her employer's conduct is
barred from recovery for that sexual harassment. As there is no evidence that the Hooters plaintiffs expressly assumed the risk of sexual
harassment by signing an exculpatory contract agreeing not to hold
Hooters responsible for sexual harassment occurring on the job, the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Complaint at 18 (cited in note 1).
See text accompanying notes 43-51.
Complaint at 18 (cited in note 1).
See text accompanying notes 26-33.
Restatement (Second) § 496A.
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plaintiffs must have evidenced their consent to incur the risk, if at all,
2
by their conduct.1S
To determine whether the Hooters plaintiffs can be said to
have assumed the risk of sexual harassment, one must first examine
whether any conduct by the plaintiffs impliedly evidenced their consent to assume that risk. The implied agreement of a plaintiff to
relieve a defendant from liability for any harm resulting from certain
risks can be shown simply by the plaintiffs actions in voluntarily
engaging in some activities. 133 In their treatise on torts, Prosser and
Keeton state that implied assumption of risk can arise when a plaintiff voluntarily enters into a relationship with the defendant, knowing
that the defendant will not protect him against certain future risks
that may arise from that relationship.-14 It can be argued that the
plaintiffs' conduct, in agreeing to work for a restaurant named after a
slang-term for women's breasts where waitresses must wear sexually
provocative attire, evidenced their consent to relieve Hooters from
liability for any sexual harassment which they reasonably expected at
the time they took their jobs. 13 5
It seems undebatable that the Hooters plaintiffs, when they
decided to work at Hooters, knew that sex appeal was a substantial
part of the product Hooters offered to its customers. 136 This knowledge of the importance of sex appeal to the plaintiffs' place of employment is in direct contrast to the situation in Sage Realty, where
the plaintiff had no idea that she would be required to wear a sexually
provocative uniform at the time she began her job, and the nature of
her job, a lobby attendant in an office building, gave her no reason to
believe that sex appeal was a part of her employer's business.3 7
Because the Hooters plaintiffs in all likelihood knew that sex appeal
132. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text.

133. Rosenlund and Killion, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. at 244 (cited in note 55). An example is that
participants in contact sports are usually held to assume both the risk of contact reasonably
expected in the sport and the risk of an occasional unreasonable blow. Id.
134. Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 68 at 481 (cited in note 56).
135. The plaintiffs' decisions to work at Hooters are much more probative on the issue of
whether they assumed the risk of sexual harassment than they are on the issue of whether the
plaintiffs welcomed certain harassing conduct. See text accompanying notes 114-16. In addition, while a plaintiff's complaints about sexual advances should outweigh any behavior suggesting that she welcomed the advances, such complaints will not allow her to recover for the
harassment if she previously assumed the risk of harassment.
136. Apparently, Hooters employees are currently required to sign the company's sexual
harassment policy, which includes an acknowledgment that "female sex appeal is an essential
ingredient of the Hooters concept." Associated Press, FormerHooters Employees Firedfor Not
Signing Form, Miami Herald 5B (Aug. 14, 1993).
137. See text accompanying notes 26-30.
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was part of the product Hooters was selling, it also seems likely that
they knew there was a risk that customers would make passes at
them and make sexual comments to them. Although the plaintiffs
may argue that they were not in fact aware of this risk, the risk may
138
be so obvious that no jury would believe them.
While the risk of harassing conduct by customers was arguably
known to the plaintiffs at the time they decided to work at Hooters,
the same cannot be said about the risk of harassing conduct by supervisors and co-workers. The fact that sex appeal is an essential ingredient of the product Hooters offers to its customers does not make it
obvious that a risk of working at Hooters is unwelcome sexual comments and contacts by supervisors and fellow employees. Unlike the
risk of sexual comments from customers, it is unlikely that the
Hooters plaintiffs knew when they decided to work at Hooters that
their employment would place them at risk of being subjected to sexual comments about their bodies and to groping by supervisors and
fellow employees. It is highly unlikely that the plaintiffs assumed the
risk of harassing conduct by Hooters management and co-employees
when they accepted employment at Hooters.
Another factor to be considered is whether the Hooters plaintiffs voluntarily accepted the risk of sexual harassment. It is possible
that the individual Hooters plaintiffs did not voluntarily accept the
risk of sexual harassment, because their decision to work at Hooters
may have been prompted by economic need. Defendant Hooters could
make a strong case that the plaintiffs' choice of Hooters as a place of
employment was voluntary, however, by producing evidence of other
restaurants and bars in the same market where the plaintiffs could
have found work, or by showing Hooters possessed particular
characteristics that led the plaintiffs to affirmatively choose to work
there. For example, a former Hooters waitress from Florida, who
brought a sexual harassment lawsuit against Hooters claiming that
her manager punished her with undesirable shifts when she refused
his sexual advances, remarked about Hooters: "I knew I wanted to
work at Hooters. It's great money, a fun place to work.... I loved
the [Hooters] concept. If I can use my looks to make good money, why
shouldn't I?" 139

138. See, for example, note 3.
139. Patty Shillington, Hooters Concept: Sexist or Just Good, Clean Fun?, Miami Herald 1J
(Aug. 1, 1993) (quoting Christine Brooks). Another Hooters waitress claimed that Hooters was
the perfect summer job because the money was great and because working at Hooters had given
her more confidence. Id. (quoting Heather Citta).
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It appears that the Hooters plaintiffs voluntarily decided to
work at Hooters despite the known risk of sexual harassment by
customers. As such, they may have impliedly assumed the risk of
sexual harassment. Courts refuse to recognize the doctrine of assumption of risk, however, when allowing the plaintiff to assume the
risk is contrary to public policy, such as when the defendant has substantially greater bargaining power than the plaintiff.'40 The employment relationship at issue in the Hooters lawsuits may be such a
situation. Prospective employees at Hooters certainly lack the bargaining power to convince Hooters to change its name or to persuade
Hooters to permit them to wear less provocative attire. After all,
Hooters maintains that sex appeal is an essential aspect of the
Hooters concept.' 4 ' Nevertheless, as discussed above, if there are
other restaurants and bars where the plaintiffs could have worked as
waitresses, or if the plaintiffs made the affirmative choice to work at
Hooters because of its promotion of sex appeal, courts may find that
allowing the plaintiffs to assume the risk of sexually harassing comments by customers does not offend public policy.
In conclusion, application of the assumption of risk defense to
the allegations of hostile work environment sexual harassment in the
Hooters lawsuits suggest that the plaintiffs may have knowingly and
voluntarily assumed the risk of verbal harassment by customers, but
that they did not assume the risk of verbal or physical harassment by
their supervisors or fellow employees.

IV. IN WHAT SITUATIONS SHOULD AN ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEFENSE
TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT BE AVAILABLE?
The prospect of allowing an assumption of risk defense to some
hostile work environment sexual harassment claims is somewhat
alarming because allowing the defense in an excessively broad category of cases could thwart completely the ability of sexual harassment
law to make workplaces more open to women. One example of the
dangers of the assumption of risk defense is the infamous and highly
disfavored Rabidue v. OsceolaRefining Co.142

140. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the public policy
implications of allowing an assumption of risk defense in sexual harassment law, see Part V.B.
141. See note 136.
142. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
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A. Rabidue-An Argument Against an Assumption of Risk Defense in
Sexual HarassmentLaw
In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., the plaintiff, Vivienne
Rabidue, brought a sexual harassment suit against her former employer.143 The alleged sexual harassment was primarily caused by
the conduct of the plaintiff's co-worker, Douglas Henry.1 4 The
Rabidue majority acknowledged that Henry was a vulgar individual
who frequently made obscene comments about women generally and
about the plaintiff in particular. 145 In addition, there were pictures of
nude or scantily clad women displayed in common work areas. 146 The
court required the same elements for a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim as described in Henson, 47 but added the requirement that the sexual harassment be severe enough to seriously affect
the plaintiffs psychological well-being. 48
The court stated that the totality of the circumstances should
be examined to determine whether a reasonable person would be
offended by the work environment at issue and whether the particular
plaintiff was actually offended by the environment.'49 Relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances included "the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before
and after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs, coupled with
the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering
that environment."15 ° The court noted that the presence of actionable
sexual harassment would differ depending on the prevailing work
environment, 5' and quoted with approval from the opinion of the
district court:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments,
humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual
conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant
to-or can--change this. It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the
federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for

143. Id. at 614.
144. Id.
145. Id. In his dissent, Judge Keith noted that Henry routinely referred to women as
"whores," "cunt," "pussy," and "tits," and specifically remarked of the plaintiff, "All that bitch
needs is a good lay." Id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 615.
147. See text accompanying notes 12-16.
148. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619. This requirement was held to be improper in Harris v.
Forklift, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
149. Rabidue,805 F.2d at 620.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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the female workers of America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII
was designed to bring
about a magical transformation in the social mores of
5 2
American workers.

The Rabidue decision presents an example of the dangers inherent in allowing an assumption of risk defense in sexual harassment cases. The Rabidue court's focus on the lexicon of obscenity that
had pervaded the workplace and the plaintiffs reasonable expectation
upon entering that environment suggests that women generally assume the risk of working in a sexually hostile environment. 153 If a
workplace has always been primarily male, and obscene language and
pornography have always been present at the workplace, any woman
who voluntarily chooses to work there assumes the risk of any harassing conduct that may occur. This view of Title VII completely thwarts
the ability of the statute to make workplaces more open to women:
Any workplace that is currently obscene appears to have the right to
stay that way,' 5 or at least no woman who chooses to work there with
knowledge of the prevailing work environment has the right to complain about it. This view does not allow Title VII to act proactively,
but requires that the status quo of the hostile work environment be
maintained. The dissent in Rabidue strongly disagreed with the ma-

152. Id. at 620-21 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D.

Mich. 1984)).
153. See, for example, id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe majority suggests
through these factors that a woman assumes the risk of working in an abusive, anti-female
environment"); Jane L. Dolkhart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and
the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 Emory L. J. 151, 190 (1994) (referring to the "Rabidue
court's suggestion that the plaintiffs assumption of risk is relevant in assessing the employment
environment"); Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Standardin Sexual HarassmentLaw--Will
it Really Make a Difference?, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 227, 241 (1993) (stating that "the court intimated
that Rabidue assumed the risk of being harassed when she took a job with the company"); E.
Clayton Hipp, Now You See It, Now You Don't: The "HostileWork Environment"After Meritor,
26 Am. Bus. L. J. 339, 356 (1988) (referring to the assumption of risk theory impliedly created
by the Rabidue decision); Michael D. Vhay, Note, The Harms of Asking:
Towards a
Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment,55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 328, 347 (1988) (asserting
that the Rabidue version of a reasonableness test would "essentially expose plaintiffs to the
defense of assumption of risk").
154. The court's quoting with approval of the district court's statement that Title VII was
not meant to change work environments where sexual jokes and conversations and girlie
magazines may abound shows the court's very narrow view of Title VII. In his dissenting
opinion, Judge Keith contended that "by applying the prevailing workplace factor, this court
locks the vast majority of working women into workplaces which tolerate anti-female behavior."
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 627.
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jority's view of Title VII.155 The response to the Rabidue majority's
156
use of assumption of risk concepts has been completely negative.
B. DistinguishingHooters from Rabidue- What is the ProperScope of
an Assumption of Risk Defense in Sexual HarassmentLaw?
Can the Hooters lawsuits be distinguished from the Rabidue
case, such that allowing an assumption of risk defense in cases like
Hooters would not open the door for more decisions like Rabidue?
There are two very important differences between Hooters and
Rabidue. First, the workplaces differed greatly in the nature of the
product or service being produced or performed and in the nature of
the particular plaintiffs job. In Rabidue, the business of the employer
was refining oil, and the plaintiffs particular job was as an administrative assistant. There was nothing about the work being performed
at Osceola Refining Co. that encouraged harassing conduct, or that
155. "In my view, Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such behavior and attitudes from
poisoning the work environments of classes protected under the Act." Id. at 626 (Keith, J.,
dissenting). Judge Keith stated further:
To condone the majority's notion of the "prevailing workplace" I would also have to agree
that if an employer maintains an anti-semetic workforce and tolerates a workplace in
which "kike" jokes, displays of nazi literature and anti-Jewish conversation "may
abound," a Jewish employee assumes the risk of working there, and a court must consider such a work environment as "prevailing." I cannot.
Id. at 626.
156. See, for example, the EEOC Compliance Manual, § 615 at 3275-76 (cited in note 112):
In general, a woman does not forfeit her right to work in an atmosphere free from sexual
harassment by choosing to work in an environment that has traditionally included vulgar, anti-female language. The Commission ...agrees with the dissent in Rabidue that
a woman does not assume the risk of harassment by voluntarily entering an abusive,
anti-female environment.
Numerous law review articles agree with the EEOC about Rabidue, such as Paul B.
Johnson, The Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual HarassmentLaw: Progressor Illusion, 28
Wake Forest L. Rev. 619, 631 n.54 (1993) (stating "[iun my opinion, Rabidue was wrongly
decided... [because] the court took the erroneous view that a female employee who voluntarily
enters into a pre-existing work environment where harassment is common 'assumes the risk' of
those conditions"); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,141 U. Pa. L. Rev.
899, 966 (1993) (stating that the Rabidue court misapplied the assumption of risk doctrine by
not considering whether the plaintiff had actually assumed the risk but rather "seemed to hold
that, as a matter of law, women assume the risk of harassment if they choose to work in
nontraditional settings which are commonly the scene of offensive conduct"); Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, PluralistMyths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 Yale L. J. 1177, 1199 (1990) (stating that the court's assumption of risk
analysis "ignored the possibility that [Rabidue's] situation was the product of structural
inequities in society that she was powerless to overcome"); Lester, 26 Ind. L. Rev. at 241 (cited
in note 153) (arguing that the Rabidue court's assumption of risk analysis was based on
conjecture, because the court never attempted to determine whether Rabidue knew about the
offensive work environment before she took the job); Hipp, 26 Am. Bus. L. J. at 356 (cited in
note 153) (asserting that the assumption of risk theory impliedly created by the Rabidue court is
clearly unacceptable).
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suggested that harassing conduct must be permitted to occur or else
the business would be threatened. In Hooters, however, the nature of
the employer's business can be characterized as serving food and
drink in an atmosphere promoting sex appeal, and the plaintiffs' particular jobs were as waitresses who personified that sex appeal.157
Unlike the work performed at Osceola, the work performed at Hooters
does encourage sexual comments and overtures.
The focus on the nature of the work performed in deciding
whether a plaintiff should be allowed to assume the risk of sexual
harassment was supported by Judge Keith in his dissent in Rabidue.
He stated that 'lob relatedness" was the only additional factor which
should bear on whether the plaintiff reasonably found her work environment offensive.158 It is arguable that receiving sexual comments
and overtures from customers is required of a waitress in an establishment where sex appeal is a part of the product provided.
The same is not true, however, of receiving such comments
from supervisors or co-workers. The other major difference between
Hooters and Rabidue lies in the question of from whom employees
may assume the risk of sexual harassment. After applying the assumption of risk doctrine to Hooters, this Note asserts that the plaintiffs only assumed the risk of harassing conduct by customers, not of
such conduct by supervisors or co-workers. In Rabidue, the majority
suggested that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of harassing conduct by her co-workers. This difference is connected to the nature of
the businesses at issue. If sex appeal is a substantial part of the
product or service an employer provides to its customers, then it
seems logical that, in order for the employer to continue to promote
sex appeal as a part of its business, employees should be able to assume the risk of sexual harassment by customers. In contrast, there
is no rational business justification for an employer to be able to have
its employees assume the risk of sexual harassment by their fellow
employees or supervisors. Therefore, the Hooters lawsuits suggest
157. The fact that sex appeal is a substantial part of the service Hooters provides its customers is indicated by the name of the restaurant and the attire of the waitresses. See note 136.
158. The relevant question is "whether the behavior complained of is required to perform
the work." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith provided the example of
employees of soft pornograpy publishers, who, depending on their job descriptions, should
reasonably expect exposure to nudity and sexually explicit language as inherent aspects of
working in that field. Id. He also noted, "However, when that exposure goes beyond what is
required professionally, even sex industry employees are protected under the Act from non-job
related sexual demands, language, or other offensive behavior by supervisors or co-workers."
Id.
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that employees should only be able to assume the risk of sexual harassment if sex appeal is a substantial part of their employer's business and of the employee's particular job.
The comparisons between Hooters and Rabidue establish the
proper scope of the assumption of risk defense in hostile work environment sexual harassment law. Women may voluntarily and knowingly assume the risk of harassment by customers where sex appeal is
a substantial part of their employer's business and of their job in particular. 159 Allowing women to assume the risk of sexual harassment
in this narrow context protects the interests of women who desire to
market their sexuality.160

Some women, including at least some of

those who work at Hooters, choose to work in environments that
promote their sex appeal and provide a greater risk of sexual harassment, in order to receive a premium wage for their acceptance of that
risk.11 If no assumption of risk defense to sexual harassment claims
is available to employers like Hooters, employees will be able to sue
these employers based on conduct by customers that the employees
impliedly consented to assume the risk of when they accepted their
jobs. This risk of liability for sexual harassment by customers may be
so substantial that employers like Hooters will be unable to afford to
continue to promote sex appeal as a part of their business. As a result, women who want to market their sex appeal and their accep-

159. Thus, topless dancers, for example, may also be allowed to assume the risk of sexual
harassment by customers.
160. Marie Reilly describes the assumption of risk defense in the employment context as
follows:
The notion of assumption of the risk as a bar to recovery enables a person who prefers
risk to market that preference. Some workers, willing to tolerate greater risk, may
agree to work for a wage that would not be acceptable to a risk-adverse or a risk-neutral
person. By barring recovery to the worker who accepted a premium for the risky job,
the court enforces a socially optimal allocation of loss between an employer and an employee under which a risk-preferring employee agrees to accept risk in exchange for a
risk differential. If the employer knew ex ante it could not enforce the agreement with
the risk-preferring employee, it would invest in safety and pay the worker less. Without
the doctrine of assumption of the risk, or any other way of enforcing the ex ante allocation of risk, the employer would be worse off, but the employee would not be better off.
Reilly, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 467 (cited in note 86).
161. Reilly asserts that "[women can and do market their preference for risky sexual
conduct," providing the examples of women who work as "Laker Girls," those who model for
magazine swimsuit issues, and those who work as cocktail servers in skimpy attire. Id at 469.
She concludes that "[wiholesale elimination of the assumption-of-the-risk defense for employers
charged with hostile environment sexual harassment deprives women of the opportunity to
market their risk preferences, but it does not make them better off." Id. Furthermore, the
statement of Christine Brooks, a former Hooters waitress from Florida, see note 139, supports
the assertion that some women choose to market their preference for risky sexual conduct: "I
loved the [Hooters] concept. If I can use my looks to make good money, why shouldn't I?"
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tance of the risk of sexual harassment in exchange for a premium
162
wage will no longer have the freedom to do so.

To allow women to assume the risk of sexual harassment in
situations outside the narrow Hooters context, such as harassment by
supervisors or coworkers, or harassment by customers where sex
appeal is not a substantial part of the employer's business and of the
women's particular jobs, would violate the general public policy
against sex discrimination represented by Title VII. As demonstrated
by Rabidue, allowing the assumption of risk defense to sexual harassment claims in a broad spectrum of cases would seriously impede
the ability of Title VII to eliminate discrimination against women in
the workplace. The narrow scope of the Hooters assumption of risk
defense provides a balance between competing interests: the interest
of women who desire to market their sexuality and the public interest
in eliminating sex discrimination in employment. The defense as
defined would not apply in cases like Rabidue, and thus would not
perpetuate historically anti-female environments by finding that any
woman who chose to work in such an environment assumed the risk
of any harassment she received from her co-workers.
C. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines: How Does the ProposedHooters
Assumption of Risk Rule Compare to BFOQ Cases?
The bona fide occupational qualification ('BFOQ") exception to
Title VII provides that an employer can hire and employ an individual
on the basis of his or her sex in those certain instances where sex is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.163 The BFOQ defense is
analogous to the proposed Hooters assumption of risk rule.16 Wilson
v. Southwest Airlines Co.,165 however, defines the BFOQ defense more
narrowly than the proposed assumption of risk defense, and suggests
that the proposed assumption of risk defense may be contrary to the
goals of Title VII.

162. Reilly, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 469.
163. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988 & Supp.
1991).
164. The proposed assumption of risk defense provides that employees can assume the risk
of sexual harassment if sex appeal is a substantial part of the employer's business and of the
employee's particular job.
165. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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In Wilson, a class of male applicants for the jobs of flight
attendant and ticket agent with Southwest Airlines challenged
Southwest's refusal to hire males for those positions as a violation of
Title VII. Southwest admitted that it intentionally discriminated
against males, but argued that this discrimination was permissible
under the BFOQ exception to Title VII.166 Specifically, Southwest

claimed that female sex appeal was a bona fide occupational qualification for the jobs of flight attendant and ticket agent. 167 Southwest had
developed a marketing scheme that projected an image of feminine
spirit, fun, and sex appeal. 68 The airline claimed that its decision to
hire only females, dressed in high boots and hot pants, in the high
customer contact positions of ticket agent and flight attendant, was
69
an integral part of its sexy, feminine image.'

The district court held that the BFOQ exception did not justify
Southwest's refusal to hire male flight attendants or ticket agents,
0 The court followed a
notwithstanding the airline's feminine imageY7
two-step BFOQ test: (1) does the particular job at issue require that
the worker be of a certain sex; and if so (2) is that requirement reasonably necessary to the essence of the business.'7 ' Southwest conceded that males were able to perform effectively all of the basic,
72
mechanical duties required of flight attendants and ticket agents.
The airline contended, however, that only females could fulfill certain
nonmechanical aspects of the jobs, such as attracting those male customers who preferred female flight attendants and preserving the
authenticity of Southwest's feminine personality.173 The court rejected
this argument, finding that these sex-linked job functions were only
tangential to the essence of the jobs of flight attendant and ticket
agent in particular and of the airline business in general. 74 The court
held that because Southwest was not a business where vicarious sex166. Id. at 293.
167. Id.
168. Southwest's public image was based on this "love" personality. Id. at 294. Its ads
promised to provide "tender loving care" to its passengers, who were predominantly men

traveling for business.

Id. Southwest's first ads featured the slogan, "At Last There Is

Somebody Else Up There Who Loves You." Id. Its television commercials featured attractive
flight attendants in tight outfits catering to male passengers, as a female voice promised in-

flight love. Id. at 294 n.4.
169. Id. at 295. Southwest claimed that its female flight attendants had come to personify
the airline's public image. Id.
170. Id. at 304.
171. Id. at 299 (citing Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969)
and Diaz v. PanAm World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971)).
172. Id. at 300.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 302.
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ual entertainment was the primary service provided, the ability of the
airline to perform its primary business function, the transportation of
passengers, would not be at risk if it hired males. 17 Thus Southwest
failed to satisfy the requirements of the BFOQ exception to Title VII's
176
prohibition of sex discrimination.
The court refused to define the essence of Southwest's business
as including sex appeal.177 According to the court, in order to recognize a BFOQ for "mixed essence" jobs, those requiring multiple abilities, some sex-linked and some sex-neutral, the sex-linked requirements of the job must dominate. 178 Otherwise the employer will not
satisfy the requirement that sex be so essential to successful job performance that someone of the opposite sex could not perform the
job.79 The court noted that in jobs where vicarious sexual recreation
is the primary service provided, such as a Playboy Bunny or a topless
dancer, being of a certain sex would be a BFOQ. 80
Because
Southwest's primary service was not vicarious sexual entertainment,
being female was not a BFOQ for any of its jobs. i1
Wilson provides that the BFOQ defense is a very narrow
exception to Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in employment. A possible interpretation of the Wilson decision is that the
narrow scope of the BFOQ defense in sex discrimination law should
be a guide for the scope of any assumption of risk defense in sexual
harassment law, such that there can only be an assumption of risk
defense to sexual harassment when sex appeal is the essence of the
employer's business. This interpretation would mean that employers
like Hooters, which have sex appeal as a substantial part of their
business, may not be able to use the assumption of risk defense because the primary product Hooters provides is arguably food and

175. Id.
176. Id. at 304.
177. Id. at 302.
178. Id. at 301.
179. Id.
180. Id. The court emphasized that mere customer preference for employees of one sex did
not satisfy the BFOQ requirements, unless the customer preference was based on the company's
inability to perform the primary service it offered, such as where sex appeal itself was the
primary service provided. Id. at 301. See also Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389. If customer preference
was allowed to determine the validity of sex discrimination in employment in other than those
limited circumstances, "the purpose of Title VII to overcome stereotyped thinking about the job
abilities of the sexes would be undermined." Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 301 n.21.
181. Id. at 302.
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drink, not vicarious sexual entertainment. 182 Under this view, the
only employers who could use the assumption of risk defense to
claims of sexual harassment of their employees by their customers are
those whose primary product or service is sexual entertainment, such
as those employing strippers.
This interpretation of Wilson is supported by the statement,
made by the Supreme Court, that Title VII does not permit
employment decisions to be made based on stereotyped impressions
about the characteristics of males or females. 183 The anti-sexual
stereotypes statement can be viewed as implying that places like
Hooters, where stereotypes about women are flaunted as part of the
restaurant's image,'14 are disfavored under Title VII. One may contend that, because places like Hooters are arguably disfavored under
Title VII, molding an assumption of risk defense that protects places
like Hooters from some sexual harassment claims violates the policies
and goals of Title VII.
It is uncertain, however, that allowing an assumption of risk
defense in the Hooters context, where sex appeal is a substantial part
of the plaintiffs particular job and of the employer's business, would
violate the goals of Title VII. The prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sex was a last-minute amendment to the bill which became
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and there is little legislative history
explaining the goals behind the prohibition of sex discrimination in
employment. 85 Furthermore, the anti-sexual stereotypes approach
does not provide a strong argument for the position that the Hooters
assumption of risk defense is contrary to the goals of Title VII. Title
VII has failed to ban the existence of places of employment that flaunt
*sexual stereotypes far more than does Hooters. To the contrary,
courts have stated that the BFOQ defense insulates employers hiring
only females for such sex-oriented jobs as social escort, topless dancer,
and Playboy Bunny, from violating Title VII in their hiring policies.188
182. The Wilson court states, in fact, that sex does not become a BFOQ merely because an
employer decides to exploit female sexuality as a marketing tool, which is arguably the
marketing strategy behind Hooters. 517 F. Supp. at 303.
183. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)
(citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). See also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (stating that "we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group").
184. See note 106.
185. Meritor,477 U.S. at 63-64.
186. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 301 (citing St. Crossv. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case
No. CFS 22618-70 (New York Human Rights Appeal Board, 1971)) and Weber v. Playboy Club,
Appeal No. 774, Case No. CFS 22619-70 (New York Human Rights Appeal Board, 1971)).
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As mentioned in the above discussion of Wilson, sex appeal has been
found to be a bona fide occupational qualification for such jobs, where
vicarious sexual entertainment is the primary service provided.18 7 It
may be argued, however, that referring to the BFOQ cases only
supports the argument that the scope of the BFOQ exception should
be a guide for the scope of the assumption of risk defense to sexual
harassment claims, such that an assumption of risk defense should
only be available where sex appeal is the essence of the business.
There are stronger arguments, however, against this proposition. Sexual harassment was not recognized as a type of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII at the time the statute was enacted, 188
so it is unclear if and how the statutory BFOQ defense relates to
sexual harassment.19 More importantly, it seems incongruous that
an assumption of risk defense should be available only to employers
whose primary business is the promotion of sex appeal, rather than
also to employers like Hooters, which feature sex appeal as a
substantial part of their business. As discussed above, the likely
result of prohibiting an assumption of risk defense to claims of sexual
harassment of employees by customers is that employers who promote
sex appeal as a part of their product or service would be forced by fear
of liability to stop promoting sex appeal. 90 As a result, women who
want to market their sex appeal and accept the risk of sexual
harassment in exchange for a premium wage would no longer be able
to do so.' 9' Similarly, the likely result of limiting an assumption of
risk defense to sexual harassment to employers whose primary
business is the promotion of sex appeal is that only women willing to
market their sex appeal to such an extent, i.e., dance in a strip club,
would be able to receive economic benefit from marketing their sex
appeal. Women would be denied a moderate market for their sex
187. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 301.
188. The first case recognizing sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination was
Williams v. Saxben, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D. D.C. 1976).
189. See, for example, Aalberts and Seidman, 21 Pepperdine L. Rev. At 460 (cited in note
24) (contending that the BFOQ defense "will have little impact on sexual harassment cases by
non-employees in general"); Cara D. Helper, Comment, Enforcing the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin: The
Overextensionof English-Only Rules in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 79 Minn. L. Rev. 391, 402 n.61

(1994) (stating that the Supreme Court "has not associated abusive environment discrimination
with either disparate treatment or disparate impact theory. Furthermore, the employer's
defense to such claims involves the employer's response to the harassment, rather than a

business necessity or BFOQ standard'.
190. See notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
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appeal in a place like Hooters, where the "essence" of the job is
serving food and drink, but a substantial part of the job is sex
appeal. 19 2 This result, that women who wish to receive any economic

benefit from their sex appeal must work for an employer whose
primary business is vicarious sexual entertainment, seems
incongruous with the goal of Title VII to make more employment
options available to those of either sex. 193 Therefore, the argument
that the proposed Hooters assumption of risk defense is contrary to
the goals of Title VII is ultimately unconvincing.
V. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE USE OF AN ASSUMPTION OF RISK
DEFENSE IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw

A Advantages of the Defense
There are two major advantages that would result from the
recognition of a limited assumption of risk defense in sexual harassment law. The first is that the defense would allow employers who
market their employees' sex appeal to continue to exist, allowing

192. It is certainly plausible that some women, like Christine Brooks, who want to "use
[their] looks to make good money," by working at Hooters, would not want to work for an
employer, like a strip club, whose primary business is sexual entertainment. See notes 139 and
161.
193. There is one strong argument in favor of limiting the assumption of risk defense to
only employers whose primary business is vicarious sexual recreation, even though that limitation may result in places like Hooters facing too great a risk of sexual harassment liability to
continue to exist. Businesses such as Hooters, which promote sex appeal as a substantial part
of their business, may be more harmful by subtly reinforcing stereotyped notions of women than
strip clubs where sex appeal is clearly the essence of the business. It is obvious that women are
objectified in strip clubs; the objectification of women is the sole reason why such establishments exist. Businesses like Hooters, or Southwest Airlines under its former marketing
scheme, may be more detrimental to Title VIi's goal of equality of the sexes in employment
because they are more subtle in their objectification of women, by combining their promotion of
sex appeal with the provision of a sex-neutral service. Because Hooters' objectification of
women is more subtle than that occurring in businesses with vicarious sexual recreation as
their essence, and because places like Hooters are viewed as more socially acceptable than the
latter businesses (families with young children go to Hooters), Hooters may do more to reinforce
traditional stereotypes about the role of women in society. As noted by Kim Gandy, executive
vice president of the National Organization for Women, Hooters extends "the aura of night clubs
and strip joints to the neighborhood cafe." Eugene Carlson, Restaurant Chain Tries to Caterto
Two Types of Taste, Wall St. J. B2 (March 20, 1992). The danger of the subtle objectification of
women promoted by establishments like Hooters pulls against the availability of an assumption
of risk defense to employers which offer sex appeal as a substantial part, but not as the essence,
of their business. This danger must be balanced against the interest of women in being free to
make economic choices in order to determine whether the proposed Hooters assumption of risk
defense is consistent with the goals of Title VII.
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women the freedom to market their sexuality and acceptance of the
risk of sexual harassment in exchange for a premium wage.194
Allowing women the freedom to choose to receive economic benefit
from their sex appeal seems consistent with the goal of Title VII to
make more employment options available to both sexes. 195
The second advantage that would result is the recognition of
the capacity of women to make voluntary choices about where they
work and to take responsibility for those choices. Title VII, and sexual harassment law in particular, play an essential role in our society
by providing women equal access to employment opportunities.
Reading Title VII and shaping sexual harassment law so as not to
hold women accountable for choosing to work in environments promoting their sex appeal, however, can be harmful to women by failing
to acknowledge their ability to choose to work in sexually charged
environments and to face the consequences of their decisions. Such a
view of sexual harassment law places women in the role of perputal
victim, rather than establishing them as responsible actors with free
will.
In order for the sexes to be equal, it is essential for women to
be viewed as responsible actors. The capacity for responsibility is
highly beneficial to individuals, because it means that they have the
ability to exercise rational self-control and, thus, that the law should
respect their autonomy and privacy.196 Criminal law scholars view the
power of the responsible individual to exercise rational choice as an
essential attribute of the normal human being.197 Historically, women
have been viewed as unable to make rational choices about their behavior and to accept responsibility for those choices.198 The result has
been "protective" legislation that "put women, not on a pedestal, but

194. See notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
195. See Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (stating that the objec-

tive of Congress in the enactment of Title VII was to achieve equal employment opportunity).
196. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1994).
197. Id. at 12. The most human capacity is the power to choose. Because behavior is itself
a matter of choice, "it is both moral and respectful to the actor to hold the actor responsible." Id.
at 18 (quoting Stephen Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon,
49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1247, 1252-54, 1268 (1976)).
198. Coughlin, 82 Cal. L. Rev. at 28-29 (asserting that "since at least as early as the eighth
century, the criminal law has been receptive to the idea that normal women, unlike men, are
susceptible to having their choices guided by the wills of men and that this inclination for

submissiveness must be taken into account in judging women's responsibility").

Professor

Coughlin contends that the relatively recently developed battered woman syndrome defense is
dangerous because it "rests on and reaffirms this invidious understanding of women's incapacity

for rational self-control." Id. at 6.
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in a cage," 199 often by limiting the types of jobs they could have. 200 For
example, in 1872, the Supreme Court held that the decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois to refuse to grant to a woman a license to

practice law in the state did not violate the U.S. Constitution,01 with
one justice declaring that "[M]an is, or should be, woman's protector
and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life.... The paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother."20 2
The proposed assumption of risk defense recognizes that
women can voluntarily choose to work in establishments that promote
their sex appeal and holds women responsible for that choice by not
allowing them to recover for harassing conduct they knew was likely
to occur when they accepted the job. The defense thus supports a
view of women as responsible actors who have the power to exercise
rational choice, that "most human capacity."2s This view of women is
directly opposite to the position of the radical feminists, who suggest
that women do not have the ability to exercise rational choice when
their sexuality is involved. 2°4 One may argue that the proposed as-

199. Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critiqueof"The"Feminist Critique of Pornograpy,79 Va.
L. Rev. 1099, 1149 (1993) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality
opinion)).
200. See, for example, Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding an
Oregon law limiting the hours that women could work in factories or laundries).
201. Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 138-39 (1872).
202. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
203. See note 197.
204. See Reilly, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 475 (cited in note 86) (discussing the radical feminist
view that the very act of sexual conduct is "so inherently coercive, so fraught with domination
and submission, that consent to it by a woman is impossible"); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 177 (Harvard U., 1989) (claiming that "women are
socialized to passive receptivity" in the context of sexual intercourse); Andrea Dworkin,
Intercourse 125-26 (Free, 1987) (claiming that sexual intercourse is by nature coercive and
perpetuates the subordination of women).
The model anti-pornography ordinance drafted by radical feminists Dworkin and
MacKinnon reflects their belief that women are inherently incapable of voluntarily choosing to
enter into activities involving their sexuality, in particular, posing for sexually explicit pictures.
Strossen, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 1137 (cited in note 199). The ordinance provides that proof of any of
the following shall not negate a finding that a woman was coerced into posing for pornography:
that the [allegedly coerced] person actually consented to a use of the performance that is
changed into pornography; or... that the person knew that the purpose of the acts or
the events in question was to make pornography; or... that the person showed no resistance or appeared to cooperate actively in the ...events that produced the pornography;
or... that the person signed a contract, or made statements affirming a willingness to
cooperate in the production of pornography; or... that no physical force, threats, or
weapons were used in the making of the pornography; or... that the person was paid or
otherwise compensated.
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sumption of risk defense is detrimental to the goal of women becoming full and equal members of society, because it allows businesses
such as Hooters, which objectify their female employees, to continue
to exist. The position of the radical feminists is more harmful to that
goal, however, because it perpetuates the perception of women as
unable to make rational decisions about their sexuality and encourages the state to protect women from themselves.25 The radical feminist view of female sexuality "ultimately demeans and infantilizes all
women," 206 unlike the proposed assumption of risk defense, which
supports the ability of women to rationally choose whether they want
to market their sexuality and to take responsibility for that choice.
B. Disadvantagesof the Defense
There are several disadvantages to adoption of an assumption
of risk defense in sexual harassment law. One problem is that assumption of risk is a tort defense and Title VII is not a fault-based
tort scheme. 207 Tort law and discrimination law differ greatly in purpose: the purpose of tort law is risk allocation and the compensation
of individuals, while the purpose of discrimination law is achieving
the goal of equal employment opportunity.20 Tort law views people as
individuals either injuring someone or being injured and tries to discern who is at fault, while discrimination law views people as members of groups and may find someone liable even if they had no discriminatory intent if their action negatively affected a certain
group.209 The aim of Title VII is the effect of an employment practice,
Id. at 1137-38 n.155 (quoting Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship,Pornograpy
and Equality, 8 Harv. Women's L. J. 1, 26 (1985)). The city of Indianapolis enacted an
ordinance based on the Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance; the ordinance was declared
unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment in American Booksellers Association
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), affd mem. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
205. See note 204. Many feminists are realizing that emphasizing the victimhood of
women "can backfire against gender equality." Strossen, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 1152.
206. Strossen, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 1140.
207. Ellisonv. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
208. Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the
Shapingof Legal Standards,43 Emory L. J. 151, 191 (1994).
209. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that certain employment practices can violate Title VII even if the employer has no discriminatory intent).
In her highly influential book Sexual Harassmentof Working Women, Catharine MacKinnon
asserts:
Torts best redress injuries to one's person, [such as] to individual sexuality as an aspect
of self,rather than to public and shared social existence, [such as] sex in employment....
To the extent that tort theory fails to capture the broadly social sexuality/employment
nexus that comprises the injury of sexual harassment, by treating the incidents as if
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rather than the motivation of co-workers or employers.210 The tort
defense of assumption of risk may be out of place in Title VII sexual
harassment law because the defense focuses on whether an individual
plaintiff should be denied recovery due to the plaintiff's consent to
assume the risk of injury, rather than viewing the plaintiff as a
woman, a member of one of the groups Title VII was designed to protect. The defense, in effect, allows employees to opt out of some of the
protections of Title VII, which may be contrary to the goal of Title VII:
equal employment opportunity and the removal of workplace barriers
to equality. 211 The individual choice of the employee to waive some of
her rights under Title VII may be inappropriate because the law is
meant to serve the interests of women as a group.
Another related problem with the proposed assumption of risk
defense is that tort law does not allow individuals to assume the risk
of injury when doing so is contrary to public policy. 2 2 A plaintiff is
generally able to assume the risk of injury caused by the defendant's
violation of a statute.21 3 The proposed assumption of risk defense

would operate to bar a plaintiffs recovery for injury caused by the
defendant's violation of a statute, because the employer would have
violated Title VII by failing to take action to stop the sexual harassment of its employees. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides
that a plaintiff is unable to assume the risk of a defendant's violation
of a statute when allowing the plaintiff to do so "Would defeat a policy
of the statute to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has
occurred upon the defendant. '214

Such a statute is generally one

which was intended to protect a particular class of persons, to which
the plaintiff belongs, from their inability to protect themselves.215 It is
they are outrages particular to an individual woman rather than integral to her social
status as a woman worker, the personal approach on the legal level fails to analyze the
relevant dimensions of the problem.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassmentof Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination
88 (Yale U., 1979).
210. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,239 (5th Cir. 1971).
211. Michael Vhay contends that "Title VII does not allow its 'risks' to be assumed. Rather,
the statute requires the eradication of discrimination." Vhay, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 347 (cited in
note 153) (criticizing the majority opinion in Rabidue).
212. Restatement (Second) §§ 496B and 496C.
213. ProsserandKeeton on Torts § 68 at 492 (cited in note 56).
214. Restatement (Second) § 496F.
215. Id. § 496F, comment d states:
Thus a child labor act will ordinarily be found to be intended to protect the child against
his own inexperience or lack of judgment, and to place the whole responsibility upon the
employer. Since this purpose would be defeated if the child were held to assume the
risk, that defense is not available to the defendant. Likewise a factory act, requiring
precautions to insure safe working conditions, may be found to be intended to protect
workmen against the economic pressure which might force them into unsafe employment; and if so, again the defense would not be permitted.
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therefore necessary to consider whether the policy of Title VII is to
place the entire responsibility for sexual harassment upon the employer, such that allowing employees to assume the risk would defeat
the fundamental purpose of the statute. It is uncertain that Title VII
was intended to protect women from their inability to protect themselves.2' 6 Nonetheless, Title VII, and sexual harassment law in particular, represent a public policy to eradicate sexual harassment from
the workplace. Allowing employees to assume the risk of sexual harassment, even in the narrow circumstances contemplated by the proposed assumption of risk defense, may cut against this policy.
The general decline of the assumption of risk defense in the
employment context is another disadvantage of the proposed assumption of risk defense. The defense became disfavored in the employment context because of the realization that it was unfair to say that
employees with no real workplace power or choice voluntarily assumed the risk of working in an unsafe environment. 217 Because of
the sordid history of assumption of risk in the employment context, it
is difficult to advocate an introduction of the defense into the employment discrimination context. This disadvantage of the defense,
however, is the least problematic. While most employees during the
Industrial Revolution had few real economic choices, female employees today can choose places to work where sex appeal is not a substantial part of their employer's business or of their particular job.
Therefore it is not unfair to say that women who choose to work at
places like Hooters voluntarily assumed the risk of sexual harassment
by customers.
C. Alternatives to the Defense
Are there any ways to accomplish the same advantages that
the assumption of risk defense would provide under the current Title
VII framework? One possibility is the unwelcomeness element. As
formulated in this Note, assumption of risk is an additional defense
available to the employer after the employee has established that she
did not welcome the harassing conduct. The Supreme Court's state216. Such an interpretation of the statute puts women in the role of helpless victim, which
may be detrimental to the goal of gender equality. See Reilly, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 474 (cited in
note 86) (discussing the dangers of viewing woment as lacking the capacity to protect themselves from "sexual loss"). In contrast, one of the advantages of the proposed assumption of risk
defense is that it represents a view of women as responsible actors with free will.
217. See notes 74-78.
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ment that a plaintiffs sexually provocative speech or dress is relevant
in determining whether she welcomed harassing conduct, however,
introduced assumption of risk concepts into the welcomeness inquiry. 218 Therefore, it is clearly possible to incorporate assumption of
risk concepts into sexual harassment law by broadening the unwelcomeness element.219 Using the unwelcomeness element to incorporate assumption of risk concepts into sexual harassment law would
accomplish the first advantage of the proposed assumption of risk
defense, allowing women to receive economic benefit from the marketing of their sex appeal. This option is problematic, however, because
the use of the term "welcomeness" suggests that women objectively
want certain harassing conduct to occur when, in fact, they merely
made a rational decision that the benefits of working in a certain
environment outweighed the risk of harassing conduct.220
Incorporating assumption of risk concepts into the unwelcomeness
element suggests that women signal their desire for sexual advances
by their choice of workplace, rather than acknowledging that their
choice of workplace was the result of a rational utility-maximizing
decision on their part.
An additional problem with the use of the unwelcomeness
element to introduce assumption of risk concepts into sexual harassment law involves the scope of the risk assumed. The proposed assumption of risk defense is very narrow, only allowing employees to
assume the risk of sexual harassment when sex appeal is a substantial part of their employer's business and of their particular job. An
explicit assumption of risk defense is also useful because it requires a
defendant to prove that the plaintiff knew about the risk and indicated her consent to voluntarily assume it by her conduct.
Incorporating assumption of risk concepts into the unwelcomeness
element would lack these limiting devices. The Meritor Court's statement regarding the relevance of a plaintiffs sexually provocative
speech or dress to the issue of unwelcomeness221 suggested that
women assume the risk of sexual harassment merely when they
speak or dress provocatively, without requiring defendants to prove
218. See notes 93-95.
219. For example, under a broad view of welcomeness, it could be argued that the Hooters'
plaintiffs' decisions to work at Hooters, a place named after a slang term for women's breasts,
where the waitresses must wear sexually provocative attire, suggests that the harassing conduct was not unwelcome, that the plaintiffs solicited such conduct or indicated that they did not
find such conduct offensive.
220. See note 13.
221. Such evidence, which the Supreme Court held was admissible on the issue of unwelcomeness, is more relevant to show assumption of risk. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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that the women knew that such behavior was likely to cause sexual
harassment or that their conduct demonstrated their desire to voluntarily assume the risk of sexual harassment. The Rabidue decision
demonstrates the dangers of a broad assumption of risk defense in
sexual harassment law.222

Any behavior by a woman that a court

thinks she should have known would cause men to harass her could
be used to show that she assumed the risk of the harassment, thus
harming the ability of Title VII to make workplaces more open to
women. The proposed assumption of risk defense is therefore preferable to incorporating assumption of risk concepts into the unwelcomeness element.
Another way to incorporate assumption of risk concepts into
sexual harassment law without creating an explicit assumption of
risk defense is to account for the plaintiffs reasonable expectations of
her work environment when determining whether the harassing
conduct at issue is severe enough to cross the threshold into actionable sexual harassment. This approach was proposed in an article by
Robert Aalberts and Lorne Seidman, 223 that suggested classifying

occupations as high, medium, and low risk, with differing levels of
harassing conduct necessary in each to be severe and pervasive
enough to constitute sexual harassment.224 A topless dancer would

reasonably expect stares and comments but not physical contact from
her audience, and a cocktail waitress in a conventional lounge would
reasonably expect some stares and an occasional compliment, while a
female employee in a conventional bookstore would reasonably expect
no sexual attention from customers at all.2 5

This sliding-scale occupational risk approach would accomplish
the first advantage of the proposed assumption of risk defense, allowing employers who market their employees' sex appeal to continue to
exist, providing women the freedom to market their sexuality. Unlike
the unwelcomeness alternative, this approach would not suggest that
women 'want" harassing conduct to occur, but would recognize that
women have reasonable expectations about the customer behavior
222. See Parts IVA and B.
223. Aalberts and Seidman, 21 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 470 (cited in note 24). "[T]he standard applied when non-employees are involved must be keyed to the reasonable expectations of
the employee in her particular employment environment." Id. "[A] woman who works in
revealing attire in an establishment that touts itself for its sex appeal would have to consider
the specific environment in determining what detrimentally alters the terms and conditions of
her work environment." Id. at 469.
224. Id. at 470-72.
225. Id.
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they will be exposed to at a particular job, and that they rationally
decide whether the benefits of the job are likely to outweigh any negative customer behavior. Therefore, this alternative also achieves the
second advantage of the proposed assumption of risk defense: It
recognizes the ability of women to rationally choose where they work
and to accept the consequences of that choice.
This approach, however, shares the unwelcomeness alternative's problem with the scope of the risk assumed. The proposed
assumption of risk defense only allows the plaintiff to assume the risk
of sexual harassment and thus only considers her reasonable expectation of her work environment when sex appeal is a substantial part of
her employer's business and of her particular job. The sliding-scale
occupational risk approach considers the plaintiffs reasonable expectation of her work environment no matter what her occupation is.
The phrase "reasonable expectation of her work environment" is
reminiscent of Rabidue,26 except that the sliding-scale approach only
applies to customer harassment. Under this approach, an employee
at a conventional restaurant may be unable to recover for harassing
conduct by customers if that particular restaurant has always featured rude comments by customers to waitresses, because that fact
would be relevant to the reasonable expectation of the employee's
work environment and to the level of conduct necessary to cross the
threshold into sexual harassment. Therefore this approach may
share the Rabidue problem of allowing currently obscene workplaces
227
to stay that way.

D. Conclusion: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to
Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual HarassmentClaims?
Because of its important advantages, the proposed assumption
of risk defense should be introduced into hostile work environment
sexual harassment law. Employers should have the opportunity to
prove that, by accepting a certain job, an employee demonstrated her
consent to assume the risk of sexual harassment by cus-

226. Rabidue, 885 F.2d at 620.
227. See text accompanying notes 153-56.
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tomers, as long as sex appeal is a substantial part of the employer's
business and of the employee's particular job.
Kelly Ann Cahill*
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